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u.s. International Trade
and Competitiveness
The U.s. trade balance has been in deficit for
over a decade, raising concern about u.s. com-
petitiveness in world markets. Pessimists believe
that u.s. producers are losing markets to their
foreign competitors who have the benefit of
lower wages, superior technology, and "unfair"
trade practices. Proponents ofthis view typically
advocate structural and industrial economic re-
forms to improve U.s. international competitive-
ness and greater management of international
trade to try to "level" the global playing field.
The appiOpriateness of such policies depends on
whether this diagnosis of U.s. trade problems is
valid. This Letter examines recent trends in U.s.
international competitiveness and trade perform-
ance, and argues that u.s. trade deficits are not
attributable to low wages or unfair practices
abroad. In fact, there are grounds for optimism,
though not necessarily for complacency, con-
cerning U.s. international competitiveness and
trade performance. u.s. exports have boomed
and the trade deficit has declined in the late
1980s,I whHe measures of labor costs and pro-
ductiVity, particularly in manufacturing, indi-
cate resurgent u.s. price competitiveness.
Trade deficits and export growth
International competitiveness is commonly as-
sessed by such measures as movements in a
country's trade balance and its share of exports
in world markets. Most concern about the U.s.
loss of international competitiveness has tended
to focus on the u.s. current account and mer-
chandise trade deficits ofthe 1980s.
Indeed, the u.s. current account, including both
goods and services, declined from a $7 billion
surplus in 1981 to a peak deficit in 1987 of $160
billion,4 percent of GNP. Concurrently, the mer-
chandise trade balance declined from a deficit of
$28 billion in 1981 to $159 billion in 1987. These
increasing deficits were associated with a sharp
rise in imports, as exports were relatively flat in
the first half ofthe 1980s.
Since the end of 1986, however, the trade deficit
has declined significantly. The merchandise trade
deficit was less than $110 billion in 1990 and de-
clined to almost $70 billion in 1991. (The current
accountdeficitdeclined even more sharply, largely
as a result of cash contributions of coalition part·
ners in Operation Desert Storm in the last two
years.)
Much of this recent turnabout, particularly dur-
ing the past year of recession, is attributable to a
slowdown of import growth. And, equally impor-
tant, over the past four years u.s. exports have
surged. From 1986 through 1991 the total value of
u.s. merchandise exports grew 86 percent, more
than 13 percent per year. In volume terms, exports
grew almost as fast, averaging more than 11 per-
cent per year. By comparison, in the OECD, ex-
cluding the U.s., export volume grew less than
5 percent per year over the same period.
An important source of strength in export growth
in the late 1980s has been manufactures, which
make up more than 60 percent oftotal u.s. mer-
chandise exports. According to GECD figures,
since 1986 the volume of U.S. manufactured
exports has risen about 90 percent, compared
with an average rise for other OECD countries of
25 percent. In 1991, as the world economy slowed
sharply, exports of U.S. manufactures rose at an
annual rate of 7 percent (based on data through
the first three quarters of the year), compared
with an average increase of just 1Yz percent in
other OECD countries.
The U.s. export boom has increased America's
share of the industrialized world's manufactured
exports from 14 percent in 1987 to 18 percent in
1990, not only restoring its share to its level in
1980, but also pushing it ahead ofJapan's current
15 percent share. While it cannot be denied that
in specific industries,such as automobiles, U.S.
firms may continue to face difficult times, the
big picture is one of U.S. export resurgence in
the late 1980s.FRBSF
Price competitiveness
International competitiveness also can be as-
sessed by relative changes in a country's produc-
tion costs and productivity. Changes in unit labor
costs, which reflect both changes in labor pro-
ductivity and wage rates, have a direct effect on
the price of goods, and therefore, affect the com-
petitiveness of a country's products in world
trade. A smaller increase (or a decrease) in unit
labor costs, relative to other countries, improves
the price competitiveness of a country's export
and import-competing industries.
Is there any evidence of a secular decline in U.s.
price competitiveness during the 1980s? During
the first half of the 1980s, according to the u.s.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, unit labor costs in
manufacturing in national currency terms actu-
ally rose more slowly in the U.S. than abroad,
with the exception ofJapan. When measured in
dollars, however, unit labor costs abroad fell be-
cause the dollar appreciated during the first half
of the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1985 unit labor
costs in dollars rose at an annual rate of 2.2 per-
cent in the U.S., while falling in 11 of 13 other
industrial countries.
This decline in U.s. competitiveness occurred
despite strong U.S. productivity growth in man-
ufacturing in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1985,
manufactures output per worker grew 4.0 percent
annually in the U.s., compared to 4.0 percent in
Japan, 2.3 percent in France, and 2.7 percent in
Germany. Thus the appreciation of the dollar in
the early 1980s, not underlying cost and produc-
tivity changes, caused U.S. manufacturers to lose
price competitiveness to foreign producers dur-
ing this period.
Since the dollar has fallen from its 1985 peak,
u.s. unit labor costs have remained constant,
while foreign unit labor costs in dollar terms have
risen substantially. Costs in Japan, the U.K., France,
Italy, Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan, for ex-
ample, all have risen at more than 10 percent
annually over the period 1985-1990. In fact, for-
eign unit labor costs measured in dollars are now
higher than they were in 1980. Thus most of the
apparent improvement in U.s. international com-
petitiveness is attributable to changes in the value
ofthe dollar, and at present, manufacturing in the
U.S. appears to have a significant cost advantage
over manufacturing in other countries.
Unfair foreign practices
While the u.s. trade balance has improved, it
remains in deficit. Is the u.s. permanently dis-
advantaged by "unfair" foreign trade practices
abroad, such as government support of selected
industries through export subsidies and trade
protection? There is ample evidence that virtually
all countries, including the U.S., maintain at least
some restrictions on imports and provide govern-
ment support for exports. Nevertheless, there is
no evidence that the u.s. trade deficits of the
1980s can be attributed to greater foreign trade
barriers or other unfair trade practices.
Lawrence and Litan (1987), for example, have
shown that the deterioration in the U.S. merchan-
dise trade balance between 1981 and 1987 was
pervasive, across both commodity groups and
countries. The decline was uniformly and propor-
tionately spread across capital goods, automotive
products, and consumer goods. Similarly, the
u.s. trade position deteriorated roughly in pro-
portion to each of its major trading partner's
share of u.s. imports and exports in 1981. To ac-
count for the turnaround of the overall u.s. trade
deficit in the eariy 1980s, foreign trade practices
would have had to change uniformly and sud-
denly around 1981, an unlikely conspiracy.
Japan, in particular, continues to be frequently
singled out as having the most unfair trading
practices of all U.S. trading partners. However, it
is doubtful that such policies have been a major
cause of u.s. trade deficits, particularly since the
Japanese.market has become somewhat more
open over the past decade. Moreover, Japan's
share of changes in the total u.s. trade deficit has
been proportional to its U.s. trade share. In 1981
Japan accounted for 9 percent of u.s. merchan-
dise exports, 20 percent of u.s. non-oil merchan-
dise imports, and a bilateral deficit (excluding oil
imports) with the u.s. of $16 billion. Had these
shares been maintained in 1987, the (non-oil)
U.S. trade deficit with Japan would have risen to
$51 billion, not much below the actual deficit of
$57 billion. Applying the same shares to 1990
gives a bilateral deficit of $52 billion, not much
different from the actual deficit of $46 billion.
Thus restrictive trade practices have not been the
driving force behind changes in either the overall
u.s. trade deficit or the U.s.-Japan bilateral trade
deficit.
Saving-investment behavior
The sharp and pervasive increase of the u.s.
trade deficit in the early 1980s suggests that the
nature of the change was aggregative or macro-
economic. In fact, that is precisely the case.By definition, a country's trade balance reflects
national patterns of saving and investment. The
current account balance equals the difference
between national saving (private saving plus gov-
ernment saving, defined as tax revenues minus
government spending) and investment. The logic
of macroeconomic accounting implies that a
country with investment opportunities that ex-
ceed its domestic savings will borrow from
abroad and run a trade deficit even if its costs
are relatively low, its home markets protected,
and its exports subsidized. Conversely, a country
with high saving relative to investment will run
trade surpluses even if its markets are open and its
products are regarded as being "noncompetitive:'
In the case of the u.s. the emergence and per-
sistence of the large trade deficits since the early
1980s can be largely attributed to changes in the
nation's saving-investment balance. Over the
1960s and 1970s the u.s. (gross) national saving
rate roughly equaled the investment rate and re-
mained constant at 19 to 20 percent of GNP. In
the early 1980s, however, the saving rate fell by
3 percentage points, largely as the result of large
government budget deficits, \A/hile investment
fell 1 percentage point. The resulting net saving
deficit led to the appreciation ofthe dollar and
the associated current account deficits that emer-
ged in the early 1980s. Declines in the budget
deficit since 1987 have contributed to a subse-
quent decrease in the net saving and current
account deficits.
Thus further macroeconomic policy adjustment,
ideally through either a fiscal contraction or an
increase in private saving (or, less ideally, through
a reduction in domestic investment) is needed to
accommodate further improvement in the trade
balance over the long run. Improved u.s. interna-
tional price competitiveness alone is insufficient.
Looking ahead
An overly pessimistic view concerning U.s. com-
petitiveness in world markets is unjustified. U.s.
exports have boomed and the trade deficit has de-
clined in the late 1980s, while measures of labor
costs and productivity, particularly in manufac-
turing, indicate resurgent U.S. pilce competitive-
ness. U.s. productivity growth in the 1980s has
been comparable with, and in some cases better
than, other industrial countries. The continued
existence of u.s. trade deficits reflects an imbal-
ance of national saving above investment, not
any fundamental decline in U.s. international
competitiveness.
Of course, too much complacency is unwar-
ranted; to sustain its productivity growth per-
formance over the long run the U.s. must pursue
policies that will foster greater private capital for-
mation, increased investment in infrastructure,
expanded research and development expendi-
tures, improved educational quality, and entre-
preneurial activity. But thinking that the U.S. is
uncompetitive and "over the hill" can create
undue attention for inappropriate short-term eco-
nomic solutions, such as greater protectionism,
managed trade policy, or industrial targeting,
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Monetary Policy Objectives for 1992
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan presented a report to the Congress on the Federal
Reserve's monetary policy objectives for 1992 on February 19. The report includes a summary of
the Federal Reserve's monetary policy plans along with a review of economic and financial devel-
opments in 1991 and the economic outlook in 1992. Single or multiple copies of the report can be
obtained upon request from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco, CA 94120; phone (415) 974-2246.
Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, orof the Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorial cOmments may be addressed to the editororto the author.•.. Free copies of Federal Reserve publications can be
obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
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